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Abstract
The creation of dynamic coalitions is a challenging task, seen from a security perspective. Due to the
presence of conﬂicting requirements and speciﬁcations, the policy negotiation and policy merging processes
call for the use of eﬃcient techniques to resolve ambiguities. Constraints and constraint programming
on the other hand, are useful means for representing a wide range of access control states and access
control problems. In this paper we utilize constraints to represent access control policies in a multi-domain
environment. In contrast to monolithic (crisp) constraint satisfaction techniques, we extend the applicability
of constraints for access control, by examining soft constraints and partial constraint satisfaction. We also
introduce a security framework based on fuzzy constraints that allows the determination of preferences for
the participating domains.
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1 Introduction
The emergence and rapid proliferation of networked infrastructures introduce new
challenges to the integration of Information Systems. Coalitions between autonomous
systems are often formed between organizations that jointly work under a common
framework (ex. Ministries in e-government infrastructures, interconnected hospi-
tals in e-healthcare environments), in order to enable access over shared resources
[11]. Security under these circumstances is a major concern, since heterogeneity,
diﬀerent policy speciﬁcations and diverse restrictions emerge for each domain. It is
also apparent that under these circumstances, conﬂicts are expected to emerge. The
formation of such coalitions and their security management are time-consuming and
error prone, if we rely more on human intervention and less on the use of ﬂexible
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methods and automated tools [8].
Instead, we propose a framework that facilitates security management using con-
straints. Constraints are an important aspect of Role Based Access Control Models,
which currently attracts considerable attention in the security research area. Var-
ious access-control restrictions and security related parameters can be formulated
using constraint based representations. Particularly in a multi-domain environ-
ment, security management is harder to implement, since local policies introduce
additional constraints leading to several types of conﬂicts; it has also been proved
that the problem of interoperation among multiple policies can be considered as an
instance of the satisﬁability problem [3,10], which is known to be NP-complete.
Therefore, in cases where multiple constraints may lead to dead-ends, partial con-
straint satisfaction techniques can provide alternative ways to ﬁnd an acceptable
solution.
The contribution of our work is on the following: we show the applicability of partial
constraint satisfaction methods as a support tool for conﬂict resolution. We also in-
troduce a ﬂexible security framework, based on the combination of fuzzy constraints;
through this framework domains in a multiple policy environment may deﬁne their
preferences over shared resources. Therefore, the administrative overhead of the
system can be minimized signiﬁcantly, without violating critical constraints.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses partial constraint
satisfaction techniques and brieﬂy discusses the use of constraints for access control.
Section 3 introduces our fuzzy constraint framework and provides a detailed exam-
ple on the utility of this framework to resolve policy conﬂicts. Section 4 discusses
related work in comparison with our approach. Section 5 concludes the paper and
provides directions for future work.
2 Constraints for Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
Speciﬁcation
A constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) consists of a set of problem variables, a set
of domain values, which can potentially be assigned to these variables, and a set
of constraints specifying which combinations of values are acceptable. Informally,
we can consider a constraint as a combination of acceptable values for a set of
problem variables. Constraints are an important aspect of RBAC. RBAC regulates
the access of users to information and systems resources, on the basis of tasks that
users need to execute within the system limits. A complete RBAC model includes
the following variables and functions:
• The sets U (users), R (roles), P (permissions) and S (sessions)
• User to role assignment UA ⊆ U ×R: U → 2R
• Permission to role assignment PA ⊆ P ×R : R → 2P
• A mapping of sessions to a single user assignment US: S → U
• A mapping from sessions to the set of roles associated with each session S → 2R
• A partial ordering RH ⊆ R × R, represented by the symbol: ≥ , which deﬁnes
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role hierarchy. R1 ≥ R2 implies that R1 inherits permissions from R2.
We can therefore consider U = 〈U1, U2, .., Un〉 the set of users, which map to a set
R = 〈R1, R2, ..Rm〉 of roles, and we can also consider a set O = 〈O1, O2, .., Ok〉 of
shared resources. Additionally, access attributes may be considered members in a
totally ordered set A = 〈w, x, r, wx, .., wrx〉 (combination of values w, r, x as de-
noted in UNIX c©notation). We are interested in forming constraint speciﬁcations
which are triplets of the form < R,O,A >.
In multi-domain environments, we are interested in assigning privileges to users be-
longing to another domain. This raises complexity, since classifying permissions in-
dependently for each user for his (her) and other domains may signiﬁcantly increase
the number of entries in an access matrix (depending on the number of participating
domains and shared resources). Instead we adopt the solution of policy mappings
[2], that allow the determination of corresponding roles from one domain to an-
other. Speciﬁcally, we introduce a mapping process F(Ri,Ok,Ai) → (Rj , Og, Al))
that maps roles Ri from one domain to roles Rj from other domain. In order to
ensure authorized accesses, the global policy that emerges from merging the local
policies has to be compliant with restrictions originating from the participating do-
mains. We will attempt to provide a framework that resolves such conﬂicts, while
reducing the administrative overhead (without violating any critical constraints).
2.1 Problem formulation - Shared resources access example
Through the forthcoming paragraphs we will use an example of a (non-critical) con-
ﬂict for an access control problem in multi-domain environments. For the descrip-
tion of the problem as well as for its solution, we will use a qualitative description
of constraints. In Section 4 we will extend our framework by incorporating fuzzy
constraints in the same example. Diﬀerent types of conﬂicts as well as a more for-
mal description of other possible types of conﬂicts (separation of duty, etc) are not
covered due to space limitations; however, they can be treated in a similar manner.
We will consider the case of two interconnected domains attempting to establish
encrypted communication through IPSec [12]. According to the policy mappings
predeﬁned by coalition administrators, a remote role from domain B is assigned to
domain A as (superior) Role R (Fig.1).
According to RBAC principles, R may inherit permissions from R1 or R2. Now
considering this classiﬁcation of the remote user from domain B, we want to estab-
lish a way to (semi-)automatically assign access permissions in order for him/her
to be able to access the shared resources. Due to restrictions imposed by IPSec
local policies (such as local ﬁrewall rules) such a task may be subject to additional
constraints. For example, in IPSec a local ﬁrewall may deny the establishment
of a channel between the two domains if remote access is attempted through an
encrypted channel. If this happens, then the local policy restrictions do not al-
low interoperation between the two domains. We assume that in domain A two
databases are maintained: DB1 and DB2, with DB1 holding data more sensitive
than DB2. Role R1 may be allowed to access (read) Database DB2 and DB1 (the
second database should not be allowed to be viewed or altered remotely). In this
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Fig. 1. A policy mapping example between two interconnected medical domains.
case access to both is denied by local ﬁrewall rules due to the restrictions imposed
by IPSec. Additionally, Role R2 may not access DB2 remotely and should not
(strict restriction) gain access to DB1. The remote access restriction on all types
of ﬁles also holds for Role B.
2.2 Partial satisfaction techniques for overcosntrained problems
In order to ﬁnd acceptable combinations of the form 〈R,O,P 〉, the ﬁrst choice
would be to use a classical algorithm such as backtracking and perform a search
examining all the possible value combinations (in order to associate access rights
with the shared objects for the remote role of Domain B). It is easy for someone to
verify that all combinations fail, since we are referring to remote, encrypted access
attempts. (the dashes over permissions in Fig.1 indicate failure of all combinations).
Instead of exhaustive searching for a perfect solution that violates no constraints,
we can use an alternative to backtracking approach; branch and bound technique
[6] is looking for a solution that satisﬁes no less than a predetermined bound N
(N can dynamically change during the search). In the branch and bound search
algorithm, the distance parameter measured by N can be set initially according to
a-priori knowledge (or according to domain’s preferences) and deﬁnes the preference
to satisfy no less than N constraints. During the search for a solution a search path
consists of a set of assigned values over the domain variables of interest. The search
path leading to the most recently chosen value for a variable is the current search
path. In algorithm 1 each role in the hierarchy of remote domain B is checked against
the existence of corresponding roles on Domain A; accordingly for the predeﬁned
available mappings an assignment of Objects and Permissions is performed, storing
always the solution found so far that violates as fewer constraints as possible. N,
S and Best-solution are global variables in the algorithm, containing the necessary
and suﬃcient bounds (domain’s preferences) and the best solution found so far,
during the iterative repetitions of the algorithm.
Our approach calculates for all pairs of roles for both collaborating domains the
values < Ri, Rj,O, P >, thus calculating for each role on a domain the possibility
to access resources from other domains (based on the grounds of maximal constraint
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Algorithm 1 Step 1: For each role ri (ri is a role belonging to the remote domain)
Step 2: For each role rj ( rj is a role belonging to the target domain)
Step 3: If mapping between roles exists (ri → rj) then Call Classify PA BB S
(role-hierarchy-path, Distance, DomainA-roles, Objects, Permissions, Values)
[PA BB S:Classify based on PArtial Branch and Bound Search and backtrack] [Backtrack Search: Partial
Searches in order to try combinations of values over the search path and associate Access rights (permis-
sions / privileges) with objects]
Step4: Return
Step 5: Subroutine Classify PA BB S (Search path, Distance, Variables, Values)
([Variables: the Domain variables of interest] [Values: Values assigned to the variables] [Search path: a
Set of assigned values over the domain variables] [Dimension: The number of constraints violated by the
speciﬁc combination of values] [S Bound: Dynamically computed in each iteration bound])
Step 6: If Variables=nil then [Values have been assigned to all variables in Search-path]
Step 6:Best-solution ← Search-path, N ← Distance
Step 7: If N≤ S Bound then return ’FINISHED’ [Satisfactory solution was found]
Step 8: Else return ”KEEP - SEARCHING” [repeat with another value for the last variable
assigned to Search-path]
Step 9: Else if Distance =N then Return ”KEEP - SEARCHING” [ Search-path was
extended to assign values for remaining variables that do not violate more constraints]
Step 10: Else [try to extend Search-Path] Current-value ← (ﬁrst value in Values)
New Distance ← Distance
Step 11: Try choices in Search-Path from ﬁrst to last, as long as New Distance<N
Step 12: If choice is inconsistent with Current-value then New Distance ←
New Distance+1
Step 13: If New Distance < N and Classify PA BB S (Search-path plus current-
value,New Distance, Variables minus ﬁrst variable, Values of second variable in
Variables) = ’FINISHED’ then return ’FINISHED’ [Search-path suﬃciently extended]
Step 14: else [check for another value] return Classify PA BB S (Search-path, Distance,
Variables, Values minus current value)
satisfaction, which provides a form of optimization). The advantage of branch and
bound is that it does not need to search all possible pairs and that it can stop
when a satisfactory solution is detected (thus achieving better response times for
the overall system performance).
The algorithm crosses the search tree, by moving down to the lowest level of the
tree, each level corresponding to a problem variable. A set of assigned values to
the problem variables consists of a search path. The term ”distance” refers to
the number of constraints violated by a speciﬁc combination of values. In our
example, by the time we chose to assign to role R the permissions of role R2 (since
a superior role inherits the permissions of a minor role) and by the moment we
attempt to provide access to DB1, we have a constraint violation, leading to the
assignment d=1. Next, by attempting to classify permissions (one level below at
the search path) over the resources, we have d=3, since DB1 should not be accessed
or modiﬁed remotely by any role, and role R2 should not be eligible at all to access
the speciﬁc resources. N is used to store the number of inconsistencies in the
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best solution. As the branch and bound search proceeds, a better solution is found
violating one single constraint (R1,DB2, r) where only the encrypted remote reading
privilege is violating the domain’s policy). By relaxing this (non-critical) constraint,
the aforementioned RBAC policy integration approach seems to be able to get a
satisfactory solution (in Fig. 1 this solution is indicated by a circle). Therefore, by
applying partial constraint satisfaction techniques it is possible to achieve solutions
to the multiple policies paradigm (excluding critical policy restrictions). We have
to note also that this technique does not guarantee that the best solution will be
found; Depending on the circumstances often immediate answers are required; for
example a policy decision is subject to time restrictions. In such a case the algorithm
provides the best solution found (within pre-speciﬁed time intervals). It is also not
deﬁnite that a solution will be found; in worst case the search times are no better
than backtracking (exponential).
3 Fuzzy constraints
In contrast to crisp constraints, soft constraints allow determination of preferences
between values (k-tuples) that can be assigned to a set of variables [7]. These pref-
erences may be considered as members of a totally ordered (fuzzy) relation, that
assigns to each tuple a level of preference μe(u1, .., uk) in a totally ordered set [0,1].
As a fuzzy constraint we can consider a mapping from a domain (D = D1, .,Dk)
to the [0,1] interval. For a fuzzy constraint c the number c(v1, .., vk) denotes ”how
well” the tuple (v1, .., vk) satisﬁes the constraint.
We can extend therefore the notion of a CSP to incorporate fuzzy preferences:
as a fuzzy CSP we can consider a list of variables (x1, .., xk), a list of ﬁnite do-
mains of values (D1, .,Dk) and a list of fuzzy constraints (c1, ., ck). An instantiation
v∗ ∈ D is considered as a perfect solution if all individual constraints are satisﬁed.
v∗ ∈ D is a best solution if the degree of joint satisfaction of all the constraints
C((c1, c2, .., ck)v
∗) is maximal [5]. By using soft constraints we can determine mul-
tiple ways to handle preferences.
We assume that these preferences are encoded in a fuzzy relation R that asso-
ciates each k-tuple (u1, .., uk) with a level of preference P(u1, .., uk). PR(u1, .., uk) >
PR(u
′
1, .., u
′
k) means that (u1, .., uk) is preferable over (u
′
1, .., u
′
k). PR(u1, .., uk) = 0
means that tuple (u1, .., uk) fully violates the constraint while PR(u1, .., uk) = 1
means the constraint is fully satisﬁed.
3.1 Fuzzy relations
Fuzzy restrictions are an alternative formalism to describe fuzzy constraints, oﬀering
the ability to express prioritized constraints. They oﬀer the possibility to model
priorities -similar to preferences- expressed by levels in the scale [0,1]. A coeﬃcient
ac expresses the priority degree of each constraint C and indicates the degree to
which C must be satisﬁed. ac = 1 means the constraint has to be fully satisﬁed,
while ac = 0 means it can be totally ignored. Therefore a fuzzy relation S on
U1 × .. × Uk can model the pair (C, ac) as a fuzzy relation μS(u1, .., uk)=1 in case
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(u1, .., uk) satisﬁes the constraint C or μS(u1, .., uk) = 1−ac if (u1, .., uk) violates it.
In other words, μS is determined by whether the maximum value is achieved through
satisfying the constraint or by violating it; For a soft constraint C, modeled by the
fuzzy relation R, the pair (C, ac) is represented by the fuzzy relation μS(u1, .., uk) =
max(1− ac, μR(u1, .., uk)) [5].
Of great value is also the ability to treat concurrently multiple constraints. Two
operations can be deﬁned under this context: combination and projection. Given
two subsets W = {w1, ., wk} and Y = {y1, ., yi} of the sets of variables (x1, ..xk),
where W ⊆ Y and a fuzzy relation T restricting the possible values of Y, then
the projection of T on W is a fuzzy relation R = T↓W , deﬁned by μR(w1, ., wk) =
sup{(uy1,,u(yh))/(uy1,,uy2)↓W=(uw1,,uwk)}μT (uw1, , uwk) where (uw1, ..uwk) denotes the
restriction of (uy1, ..uyi) on W. Informally, the fuzzy relation μR denotes to what
extent a partial instantiation (uw1, .., uwk) of Y can be extended to a complete
instantiation of Y that satisﬁes T. This is very important in case we have ﬁrst
instantiated the constraints of interest and we want to extend the least important
constraints so as to satisfy (partially) the given problem to the highest degree.
The combination T = R⊗S of two fuzzy restrictions R and S, restricts the possible
values of two sets of variables X and Y over the possible values of W = X ∪ Y . It
is deﬁned by μT (uw1, .., uwk) = min{(μR(uw1, .., uwk) ↓ X), (μR(uw1, .., uwk) ↓ Y )}.
Typically the outcome of μ(R1⊗R2⊗R3⊗..⊗Rm)(u1, .., un), estimates to what extent
the combination (u1, .., un) of values satisﬁes jointly the constraints. Therefore it
enables us to transform preference levels on constraints into preference degrees on
the possible solutions.
In addition we may consider the set of individual constraints as a decomposition of
a fuzzy global relation ρ = R1⊗R2⊗R3⊗ ..⊗Rn, restricting the combination of
values that may be assigned to the set of variables (x1, ..xn). Even if there is no
correlation in the set of constraints {R1, R2, .., Rm}, ρ implies a restriction between
the acceptable values for a variable, no matter what values are assigned to other
variables. In most cases there is an implied variation on values that can be assigned
to other variables: ρ↓{xi,xj} ⊂ ρ↓{xi} ⊗ ρ↓{xj}.
3.2 Towards fuzzy solutions
The solution of fuzzy constraint problems in most of the cases emerges as an ex-
tension of a partial solution, that instantiates the values in the given variables
sequentially in such a manner that the given instantiation satisﬁes all the deﬁned
constraints. The notion of partial satisfaction is of primary importance within the
context of fuzzy constraint problems. Selection criteria for constraint satisfaction
can be the instantiation of the most critical values ﬁrst, or alternatively the most
constrained values ﬁrst.
The appropriateness ai(v) of a value v ∈ Di for a variable xi is evaluated on the
basis of the degree of the best possible joint satisfaction of the constraints referring
to xi. It is deﬁned as ai(v) = max{C((ci1, .., cih), v)|v ∈ Di1×, × Dik−1 × {v} ×
Dik+1.. ×Dih}. We can also measure the diﬃculty of a variable, according to the
formula di =
∑
v∈Di
αi(v)[4]. This metric can be used as an estimation of the most
P. Belsis et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 179 (2007) 75–86 81
critical parameter, which should be instantiated ﬁrst. While looking for a best solu-
tion we ﬁrst instantiate variables with a limited set of appropriate values, in order
to apply branch and bound techniques (which keep track of the best so far known
good solution). By calculating the degree of satisfaction of an existing partial so-
lution, we continue exploring only further solutions that achieve higher degree of
satisfaction. All partial instantiations for which the degree of satisfaction does not
exceed the best solution found so far are then excluded from further consideration.
3.3 Applying fuzzy constraints for access control
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Fig. 2. a(left). Expressing preferences over constraints b(right). Calculation of values to reach the best
solution.
We now re-consider the role - permission assignment problem of Section 2. We
will model the problem as a FCSP with variables R (role), O (object) P (permission)
with value-domains {R1, R2}, {DB1,DB2}, and {w,r,x} respectively. We have de-
ﬁned a matching preference according to diﬀerent combinations of variables, which
is represented in (Fig. 2a) (some combinations which are totally unacceptable are
not represented). As already discussed, the problem is over-constrained and there
is no exact solution; we can consider partial solutions only.
We will utilize as measures the appropriateness and diﬃculty of a variable that
were described in paragraph 4.2, in order to calculate optimal solutions that satisfy
the given constraints to the highest extent. Therefore we calculate for the domain
variables starting from the role variable R: aR(R1) = 1, aR(R2) = 0.2, dR = 1.2.
For variable P (permissions), we have: ap(r) = 1, ap(w) = 0.8, ap(x) = 0.7 dp = 2.5
while for variable O (objects to be accessed): ao(DB1) = 0.5 and ao(DB2)=0.8
giving a dO = 1.3. Hence, the most critical variable R that achieves lower value
for the diﬃculty metric is ﬁrst instantiated getting the value R1, which is the value
that satisﬁes best the constraint.
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Next, among the two remaining variables, the most critical needs to be instanti-
ated. Since there has been a selection for R, the search space for the remaining
values has been reduced so as to include combinations that include the R1 choice
for the R selection (Fig 2a). Therefore, for the remaining two variables we have:
aP (w) = 0.8, aP (r) = 1, aP (x) = 0.7, with diﬃculty dP = 2.5 and aO(DB1) = 0.5,
aO(DB2) = 0.8 with diﬃculty dO(O) = 1.3. From the last calculation it is obvious
that the next variable to be instantiated is Object (O) (since the diﬃculty for this
variable is lower) and the most appropriate value (Object) to be assigned to the
already selected R1 value (for the role variable) is DB2.
We have achieved so far to automatically classify R1 to be most possible to access
DB2, which satisﬁes better among the two choices the constraint; the next step is to
check for inconsistencies with the possible combinations of permissions. We can see
that the most acceptable solution is r, which achieves higher degree of satisfaction.
Therefore we conclude that the most satisfactory combination is the triplet 〈R,O,P 〉
〈R1,DB2, r〉 (Fig. 2b). The total satisfaction degree of the achieved solution is given
by the product combination principle Cprod((c1, .., cn), v) =
∏n
i=1 ci(vi). This metric
estimates to what extent a given set of values satisﬁes the total set of constraints.
In our case the achieved total degree of satisfaction is 0.8.
3.4 Prototype evaluation
Fig. 3. Access Control architecture. The sequence of messages following a request from a remote or local
domain is listed in execution order
In this section we brieﬂy describe our prototype implementation architecture.
Our basic authorization module builds upon the XACML [14] operational princi-
ples. It consists of the following entities (Fig. 3): The Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP) which grants access to roles, the Policy Decision Point which reasons over a
speciﬁc access request after evaluating the requestor’s credentials and the request
according to the available policy and the Context Manager (CM) which are re-
sponsible for collecting and sending to the PDP context related attributes, such as
domain speciﬁc information.
We have implemented a special purpose registry that stores the policy mappings
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and the preferences of the domains codiﬁed as numeric entries in a matrix. This
registry is distributed as suggested in [11], [9] in order to avoid introducing a
single point of failure. In brief, the overall operation of this multi-domain autho-
rization framework, functions as follows: The policy administrator edits the policy
and makes it available to the domain, through the Policy Decision Point (PDP).
When a request for a resource appears (Fig 3), its consistency has to be validated
with the local security policy prior to execution. In case of a request from a remote
domain, the available mappings and the domain preferences are retrieved. A calcu-
lation of the fuzzy parameters is performed, as described in section 3.3. Next, each
request (from the same or from remote domain) is directed to the Policy Enforce-
ment Point (PEP). The request is constructed in an appropriate XML message and
directed to the Policy Decision Point (PDP). Prior to the validation of the request,
the Context Manager sends additional subject, resource, action and environment
attributes to the PDP. Accordingly, the request is validated from the PDP and a
response message is sent to the policy enforcement point (PEP), which handles the
details about providing authorization to the requester.
The fuzzy decision module that calculates the criticality of constraints, presents to
the administrator conﬂicts that achieve high satisfaction degrees (and therefore do
not constitute critical conﬂicts). It can thus facilitate the administration of the
coalition by rejecting immediately all the critical violations and by requesting fur-
ther treatment for remote requests that are close to satisfying most of the locally
imposed restrictions.
4 Related work
The importance of constraints for RBAC representation has been recorded recently
in the relevant security literature.
Barker and Stuckey [1] apply constraint logic programming to express policies and
present an easy to implement technique to represent multiple access control policies.
In their work they do not provide support for multiple access control restrictions,
such as limitations to access objects at certain locations (incorporated in our ap-
proach). They also do not discuss issues of partial constraint satisfaction in the
case of presence of diverse domain restrictions; moreover, they do not discuss the
possibility to determine preferences over constraints.
Khurana et al. [8] deﬁne a model for the dynamic management of coalitions based
on the RCL 2000 language. Coalition formation is performed as a round robin ne-
gotiation where domains make proposals about the management of shared coalition
assets resources. A coalition access control matrix is formulated, that keeps records
of allowed accesses; the matrix is being modiﬁed during the negotiation process and
as intermediate system states are formed. Conﬂict resolution techniques are not
discussed. Our work, focuses mainly on resolving non-critical conﬂicts in a secure
manner with minimal human intervention.
In [13] Shaﬁq et al. deﬁne a policy merging algorithm that allows the determina-
tion of a global policy, based on a merging process of the individual access control
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policies. For conﬂict resolution they deﬁne an Integer Programming (IP) based
approach. In their work a global policy is formed as a sum of all roles and role
hierarchies of constituting domains; this makes it hard to reﬂect policy updates,
since the policy merging algorithm requires polynomial time. In our work, policy
updates are easily integrated in the registry, while there is support to deﬁne domain
preferences through fuzzy relations.
Bonatti et al [4] propose an algebra for the creation of an access control policy
out of simpler policies. In their model, the expressiveness of their language is anal-
ysed with respect to ﬁrst order logic. They show that the formal semantics of their
language are equivalent to ﬁrst order logic formulations. Our work, instead, builds
a model that allows the determination of domain preferences by means of fuzzy
expressions.
In [15] a ﬂexible framework is proposed that combines subpolicies in a hierarchical
manner. This framework allows the determination of safe release paths and pro-
vides support for conﬂict resolution by deﬁning a number of policy operators. Our
work, instead, builds upon constraints instead of logic programs, while introducing
ﬂexibility by using fuzzy constraints.
In [11], a scalable solution supporting the dynamic formation of coalitions is pro-
posed, utilising a distributed service registry, similar to the coalition registry intro-
duced in our approach. Our approach extends the functionalities of this approach
by codifying the domain preferences in a matrix (stored at the registry) and calcu-
lating dynamically the degree of satisfaction of constraints, based on the values of
this matrix.
5 Conclusions
The multi-domain policy formulation process is a complex task, subject to the
presence of multiple -and of diverse characteristics- restrictions. In order to support
coalition formation and to resolve conﬂicts, a model based on partial constraint
satisfaction has been introduced. This framework has been extended using fuzzy
constraints, which allow the determination of domain preferences and prioritization
over constraints. We have additionally illustrated the validity and applicability of
our framework by applying it to an RBAC-driven example. A prototype architecture
that builds upon standardised languages and utilises principles of our framework,
has also been described in this paper.
We are currently working on expanding the ability of our model to cover a wider
range of constraints. We also plan to measure the performance of the resolution
procedures in the presence of multiple constraints, by using a large number of access
request queries from diﬀerent domains as input .
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